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# APWG Global Phishing Survey 2H2010

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# Goals

Study domain names and URLs to:

- Provide a consistent benchmark for scope of phishing problems worldwide
- Understand what phishers are doing
- Identify new trends
- Find hot-spots and success stories
- Suggest anti-abuse measures

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## Data Set

- Comprehensive sources: APWG, phishing feeds, private sources, honeypots
- Millions of phishing URLs → small number of domain names and attacks.
- Total of 205,715,855 domain names in the TLDs we have stats for ~ 99.5% of domain names in the world.

# Basic Statistics

|                                | 2H2010 | 1H2010 | 2H2009  | 1H2009 | 2H2008 |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|
| Phishing domain names          | 42,624 | 28,646 | 28,775  | 30,131 | 30,454 |
| Attacks                        | 67,677 | 48,244 | 126,697 | 55,698 | 56,959 |
| TLDs used                      | 183    | 177    | 173     | 171    | 170    |
| IP-based phish (unique IPs)    | 2,318  | 2,018  | 2,031   | 3,563  | 2,809  |
| Maliciously registered domains | 11,769 | 4,755  | 6,372   | 4,382  | 5,591  |
| IDN domains                    | 10     | 10     | 12      | 13     | 10     |

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
# Phishing in China

- Data contribution from CNNIC and APAC (Anti-Phishing Alliance of China)
- Observers outside of China were detecting only about 20% of the phishing that targeted Chinese institutions.
- Attacks on Chinese banks, e-commerce sites.
  - Lures: Chinese-language e-mails, Chinese instant message services
  - WHOIS: registrants often listed in China, and list Chinese freemail services such as QQ.com

# Phishing in China

- 2H2010: 12,282 attacks on Chinese institutions, using 6,382 unique domain names. (That's 18% of all attacks worldwide)
- 74% of those attacks targeted Taobao.com
- Few .CN names used. CN registration policy became very restrictive in December 2009. Only 278 .CN names used in 2H2010, some hacked.
- Phishers simply switched to using other resources to phish Chinese targets:
  - Used 4,737 free CO.CC subdomains
  - Used large numbers of .COM, .TK, .INFO, .US, .IN domains
- Chinese phishers prefer to register domain names – only 8% looked hacked.

# Phishing Site Uptime 2H2010: 73 hours average, 15:19 hours median



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
# Why So High?

- Absence of Avalanche domains
- There were 4,963 phishing attacks using free CO.CC subdomains. Their median uptime was almost 60 hours – compared with 15:19 hours for all phish.
- Don't know the uptimes for the phish uniquely recorded by CNNIC/APAC




# ccTLD Uptimes

(HH:MM:SS)




# gTLD Uptimes

(HH:MM:SS)



# Phishing Rates by TLD: roughly proportional by TLD size

All Phishing Attacks, by TLD 2H2010



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## Phishing by TLD: Score

- Metric: “Phishing Domains per 10,000”
  - Measures prevalence of phishing in a TLD
  - Median score: **3.2**
  - .COM score: **2.1**
  - Scores between 2.1 and 3.2 are “normal”
  - Scores skew higher for smaller TLDs.
- Metric: “Attacks per 10,000 Domains”

## Top TLDs by Domain Score (minimum 30,000 domains and 25 phish)

| RANK    | TLD | TLD Location            | # Unique Phishing attacks 2H2010 | Unique Domain Names used for phishing 2H2010 | Domains in registry Oct 2010 | Score: Phish per 10,000 domains 2H2010 | Score: Attacks per 10,000 domains 2H2010 |
|---------|-----|-------------------------|----------------------------------|--|------------------------------|--|--|
| 1       | .TH | Thailand                | 125                              | 65   | 51,438                       | 12.6                                   | 24.3                                     |
| 2       | .IR | Iran                    | 295                              | 169  | 175,600                      | 9.6                                    | 17.0                                     |
| 3       | .MA | Morocco                 | 73                               | 34   | 36,669                       | 9.3                                    | 20.2                                     |
| 4       | .IE | Ireland                 | 112                              | 96   | 151,023                      | 6.4                                    | 7.7                                      |
| 5       | .TK | Tokelau                 | 2,533                            | 2,429  | 4,030,709                    | 6.0                                    | 6.3                                      |
| 6 (tie) | .KZ | Kazakhstan              | 49                               | 28   | 50,534                       | 5.5                                    | 9.7                                      |
| 6 (tie) | .CC | Cocos (Keeling) Islands | 4,963                            | 55   | 100,000 (estimated)          | 5.5                                    | 496.3                                    |
| 8       | .IN | India                   | 523                              | 421  | 791,165                      | 5.3                                    | 6.6                                      |
| 9       | .MY | Malaysia                | 68                               | 55   | 108,211                      | 5.1                                    | 6.5                                      |
| 10      | .HU | Hungary                 | 365                              | 255  | 542,000                      | 4.7                                    | 6.7                                      |


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# Malicious Domain Registrations

Of the 42,624 phishing domains:

- **~72% were compromised/hacked**
- **~28% were registered by phishers (11,769).** Most of those domains (6,382) were registered to attack Chinese targets.
- 9% of domains (1,503) contained a relevant brand name or brand misspelling. (Especially Taobao.com)

# 2,066 maliciously registered domains targeted WarCraft and Battle.net



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
# Use of Subdomain Services

- <customer\_name>.<provider>.TLD
- **Use of these services by phishers almost doubled in 2H2010, to 11,768 subdomains.**
- *If we counted these unique subdomains as “regular” domain names, they would represent 22% of all domains used for phishing.*
- 40% of phishing subdomains were on **CO.CC**




# Subdomain Service Phish


## Select Subdomain Reseller Phish, 2H2010



# URL Shorteners



# Virtual Hosts



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# Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)

- In last three years, we have only found two homographic attacks.
- July 12, 2010:  
<http://xn--fcebok-hwa.com> = <http://facebook.com>
- 36 new IDN TLDs have been approved
  - Russian Federation: .PФ (.RF in Cyrillic, .xn--p1ai)

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# Conclusions

- Clamp down in one place and the problems simply move elsewhere.
- Free services like CO.CC and .TK are being abused heavily by phishers.
- Subdomain services are as big a problem as the registration of regular domain names.
- Uptimes got higher – watch out!

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# APWG Global Phishing Survey 2H2010 Thank You!

For more information or data for your TLD:

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